After what the U.S. government spends for military, the next biggest federal agency is Department of Homeland Security. Seventy percent of their budget goes to private security contractors; so, after defense, the next biggest thing Uncle Sam buys is the work of private security contractors. Their work is producing phony law enforcement intelligence for a galaxy of secret, criminal databases and organized harassment programs—illegal, extrajudicial punishment without purpose or value in every case.
That’s all done in the interest of security, right? Wrong. Almost every targeted person was improperly placed on a secret watchlist, and therefore inappropriately designated a criminal, a threat to society and/or a terrorist. The number of names on the list tells us that. Further, we have only an estimate of the numbers from 2003 to 2008, in that no oversight or hard numbers are available. How many are on these lists now isn’t available and perhaps isn’t even known.
I thought it was very strange that when I told local police about the theft of this sum of money and consuming contaminated food and water in my own home, they did not care. They were provocative, dismissive and unfriendly. They wanted to know about my vehicle and whether I owned a gun. That had nothing to do with my complaints. I knew it was a clue, but it was opaque and I couldn’t guess what it meant. It turns out they checked a federal criminal database, probably KST, and they followed the guidelines. What do you know? They think I’m a terrorist. No reason is needed to put a name on a list, and expanding the lists is important for expanding these police state programs.
From Trapped In A Black Box: Growing Terrorism Watchlisting In Everyday Policing:
The total number of records in the VGTOF database increased dramatically over the relevant period (see Figure 2) [December, 2003 to December, 2008]. The total increased from under 13,054 records in December 2003 to 272,198 records by December 2008, an approximately 2,000 percent growth over only a five year period. This number includes both regular and silent hit entries (described in Section V). Even by the most conservative estimate, this means an addition of 259,144 new records to the database in a period of five years—an average of 142 new records per day.Assuming this rate of growth remained constant, an additional 388,725 names would be added to KST from January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2016. Assuming no names were removed, the new total is 660,923. The report repeatedly states this is a conservative estimate. I’d be surprised to find there are 142 people engaged in planning and carrying out terrorist activity in the whole country. Yet, there are probably far more names on these lists than 661,000.
The report uses anagrams to refer to agencies and databases. It’s mind numbing. I picked out the most used ones and defined them:
NCIC = National Crime Information Center—within FBI
TSC = Terrorist Screening Center—government's consolidation point for known and suspected terrorist information, foreign and domestic
TSDB = Terrorist Screening Database
VGTOF = Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organizations File
KST = Known or Suspected Terrorists File
NCTC = National Counterterrorism Center—part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
TREX = Terrorist Review and Examination Unit—FBI field office submits nominations to TREX, the FBI headquarters unit that processes nominations from open FBI investigations
TIDE = Terrorist Identities Datamark Environment—the NCTC database of international terrorist nominations which feeds names to TSC, which enters them into TSDB as well
No-Fly List = individuals prevented from boarding an airplane
Selectee List = individuals subject to heightened airport screening when they seek to board an airplane
CLASS = State Department's Consular Lookout And Support System used to screen visa and passport applications
TECS Database = used by customs and border patrol to screen people at ports of entry
My name has been on at least one watchlist, put there by the same people who talked the Man of Steal into taking all the trust’s money, for the purpose of obstructing justice. The tactic worked perfectly. It ignores the fact I’m not engaged in subversive activity, never was and have no plans to be. I was stripped of the law’s protection, a constitutional guarantee.
I told Steal Man these guys are trying to get rid of me and you as well. He thought I was imagining things. Since then, there have been at least 20 hard attempts to kill me, and he is DEAD. He’s been dead since May 6, 2016, and we still don’t have the medical examiner’s report. Some people think I shouldn’t be armed? No one on earth needs protection more than I.
These watchlisting programs are bogus, a waste of time and money, and they impose devastating consequences on the unlucky people whose names appear on the lists. This is how Trapped In A Black Box begins:
In the last fifteen years, the U.S. government has drastically expanded a consolidated watchlisting system that includes hundreds of thousands of individuals based on secret evidence. Some parts of that system have drawn significant attention, including the No Fly List—composed of individuals who are barred from flying to, from, or over U.S. airspace—and, to a lesser extent, the Selectee List—composed of individuals who are subjected to additional screening and questioning every time they seek to board an airplane. Yet a key component of the watchlisting system has received far less scrutiny: the Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) File, which is maintained by the FBI and is accessible to federal, state, and local law enforcement entities nationwide through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).Politicians and activist groups are saying people on the no-fly list or terrorism watchlists should not be able to buy a gun from a dealer, like that will stop gun violence. You have to wonder how legitimate are these lists, and precisely how many names are on them? Names are added to the list beginning with someone taking part in the “if you see something say something” Nazi slogan theme, among other ways. Did someone see you taking pictures with a cell phone? They might think you’re a terrorist.
The KST File is a successor to what was known until 2009 as the Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organizations File (VGTOF). Whereas VGTOF contained fewer than 10,000 terrorism related entries in 2003, KST contains hundreds of thousands of entries today. To be sure, law enforcement agencies have a legitimate interest in coordinating efforts to locate people for whom arrest warrants are outstanding. Today, though, KST is part of a vast system of domestic surveillance of people whom law enforcement labels suspect based on vague and loose criteria, with serious constitutional and privacy implications for those who are included in the File. Such individuals may be stigmatized as potential terrorists and are vulnerable to increased law enforcement scrutiny, often without knowing that they are on a secret watchlist, and without a meaningful way to confirm or contest their inclusion.
The ACLU obtained information from the FBI about its VGTOF/KST File through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request and subsequent lawsuit. Although much about the current size and operation of KST remains secret from the public, the more than 13,000 pages we now have, covering a five-year period from December 2003 to December 2008, offer key insights into the workings of this sprawling government database. Further information we analyze in this report came from another FOIA suit brought by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, inspector general reports, and the government’s Watchlisting Guidance leaked to the media in August 2014.
This report presents an analysis of the most important findings from these documents and other resources, which raise serious concerns about the fairness, accuracy, and effectiveness of the KST File.
Secret watchlisting hasn’t stopped even one terrorist event. It didn’t stop shootings in theaters and schools, and it didn’t stop what happened in Orlando.
From this ACLU report, here are the three handling codes police look at when you encounter them, and how I knew I was watchlisted:
Handling Code 1 applies to individuals with outstanding arrest warrants in the NCIC Wanted Persons File. As of 2009, Handling Code 1 reads as follows:Very quietly, Congress greatly expanded these programs in the last year. Secret, criminal watchlists might now contain millions or even tens of millions of names—and nearly every one of them has committed no crime or been engaged in subversive activity. Practically none of them are fugitives, have an outstanding warrant or are even suspected in a crime. Let’s be honest. Haul down the stars and stripes and raise the red field black swastika.
***LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION***
WARNING – APPROACH WITH CAUTION.
THIS INDIVIDUAL IS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORISM AND IS THE SUBJECT OF AN ARREST WARRANT, ALTHOUGH THE WARRANT MAY NOT BE RETRIEVABLE VIA THE SEARCHED IDENTIFIERS. IF AN ARREST WARRANT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IS RETURNED IN YOUR SEARCH OF NCIC, DETAIN THE INDIVIDUAL PURSUANT TO YOUR DEPARTMENT’S PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT, AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER AT (866) XXX-XXXX FOR ADDITIONAL DIRECTION.
IF AN ARREST WARRANT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT RETURNED, USE CAUTION AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TSC AT (866) XXX-XXXX FOR ADDITIONAL DIRECTION WITHOUT OTHERWISE EXTENDING THE SCOPE OR DURATION OF THE ENCOUNTER. IF YOU ARE A BORDER PATROL OFFICER IMMEDIATELY CALL THE NTC.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF TERRORIST WATCHLIST INFORMATION IS PROHIBITED. DO NOT ADVISE THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY MAY BE ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST. INFORMATION THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL MAY BE ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST IS PROPERTY OF THE TSC AND IS A FEDERAL RECORD PROVIDED TO YOUR AGENCY THAT MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED OR USED IN ANY PROCEEDING WITHOUT THE ADVANCE AUTHORIZATION OF THE TSC.
***LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION***
Handling Code 2 appears to pertain mainly to watchlisted individuals who are subject to current or future DHS detainers. The future detainers apply to those who would be given detainers if they encounter law enforcement.105 People with sealed federal indictments can also be subject to Handling Code 2.106 In addition, documents from 2008 indicate that Handling Code 2 could be used for entries made under “exigent circumstances which require immediate entry of the record.”107 The full text of Handling Code 2 is as follows:
***LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION***
WARNING – APPROACH WITH CAUTION. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO LAW ENFORCEMENT REGARDING ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORISM AND THERE MAY BE A DETAINER AVAILABLE FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL.
IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER (TSC) AT (866) XXX-XXXX OR, IF YOU ARE A BORDER PATROL OFFICER, IMMEDIATELY CALL THE NTC TO ASCERTAIN IF A DETAINER IS AVAILABLE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DIRECTION. PLEASE QUESTION THIS INDIVIDUAL TO ASSIST THE TSC IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL ENCOUNTERED IS THE SUBJECT OF A DETAINER WITHOUT OTHERWISE EXTENDING THE SCOPE OR DURATION OF THE ENCOUNTER.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF TERRORIST WATCHLIST INFORMATION IS PROHIBITED. DO NOT ADVISE THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY MAY BE ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST. INFORMATION THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL MAY BE ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST IS PROPERTY OF THE TSC AND IS A FEDERAL RECORD PROVIDED TO YOUR AGENCY THAT MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED OR USED IN ANY PROCEEDING WITHOUT THE ADVANCE AUTHORIZATION OF THE TSC.
***LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION***
As the above language indicates, the querying officer is instructed to “question this individual” in order to help the NTC to determine whether this person is subject to a detainer, but the message provides no guidance on the questioning or the kind of information that would assist in such a determination. It also appears doubtful that officers could question an individual “without otherwise extending the scope or duration of the encounter,” since presumably an encounter with an individual not listed in VGTOF/KST would not involve additional questioning or awaiting a reply from the TSC or the NTC. Thus, encounters with individuals subject to Handling Code 2 will likely be longer and more intrusive than they otherwise would because of the ambiguity of the instructions and the directive to officers to question the individuals further.
Finally, Handling Code 3 applies to all entries that are not categorized as Handling Code 1, Handling Code 2, or silent hits. The text of the message for Handling Code 3 states:
***LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION***
DO NOT ADVISE THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY MAY BE ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST. CONTACT THE TERORRIST SCREENING CENTER (TSC) AT (866) XXX-XXXX DURING THIS ENCOUNTER. IF THIS WOULD EXTEND THE SCOPE OR DURATION OF THE ENCOUNTER CONTACT THE TSC IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. IF YOU ARE A BORDER PATROL OFFICER IMMEDIATELY CALL THE NTC.
ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT IDENTIFYING INFORMATION DURING THE ENCOUNTER, WITHOUT OTHERWISE EXTENDING THE SCOPE OR DURATION OF THE ENCOUNTER, TO ASSIST THE TSC IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE NAME OR IDENTIFIER(S) YOU QUERIED BELONGS TO AN INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED AS HAVING POSSIBLE TIES WITH TERRORISM.
DO NOT DETAIN OR ARREST THIS INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL STATUTES.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IS PROHIBITED.
INFORMATION THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL MAY BE ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST IS PROPERTY OF THE TSC AND IS A FEDERAL RECORD PROVIDED TO YOUR AGENCY THAT MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED OR USED IN ANY PROCEEDING WITHOUT THE ADVANCE AUTHORIZATION OF THE TSC.
WARNING – APPROACH WITH CAUTION.
***LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION***
This message makes clear that the querying officer should attempt to identify, but not to arrest or detain, the individual; it also states that the officer may contact the TSC after letting the individual go to avoid extending the length of the encounter.
The three handling codes above were in operation as of 2009, but it is not clear if they continue to contain the language and format as listed above. In the past, some handling code messages contained a stronger warning against using the VGTOF hit as grounds for search and seizure:
WARNING – STANDING ALONE, NCIC VIOLENT GANG AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FILE INFORMATION DOES NOT FURNISH GROUNDS FOR THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL, VEHICLE, OR DWELLING
This warning appears to have been omitted from the most recent handling codes; the 2009 handling codes lack such specific instructions for law enforcement to ensure that they do not use KST hits improperly to extend the scope of detentions.
I have one more thing to say about this. The remaining live criminals who did this jazz are aware I see this much of their mischief. They continue to spread the potent lie I am a dangerous maniac in an effort to make others deaf, since silencing me hasn’t worked. I am still at very high risk.
